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Introduction 
In 1995, the Northern Territory of Australia became the first jurisdiction in the world to enact a 
statute law which allowed access to voluntary euthanasia. The Territory was subsequently overruled 
by the Commonwealth, and since then many legislators have proposed bills similar to that which was 
passed in 1995 or bills which would undo the overruling. To date, no such bills1 have successfully 
navigated their respective parliaments - but should they have? 
Given that none of us could reasonably wish for people to die or suffer without necessity, both 
proponents and opponents of the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia must be capable of justifying 
the impact of legalisation or criminalisation of voluntary euthanasia2. As such, we cannot simply say 
that all forms of legalisation or criminalisation are justifiable or unjustifiable without first examining 
the salient features of a given proposal. Unfettered, on-demand access to voluntary euthanasia for 
any and all - be they competent and informed at the time of request and/or death or not - is not 
clearly ethical if we wish to avoid unnecessary deaths. Equally, complete restriction - no matter the 
unbearableness of someone's pain - is also not clearly ethical if we wish to avoid unnecessary 
suffering. Thus, of the 29 bills presented to Australian parliaments that sought to legalise access, not 
all may have been ethical simply because the reason that they sought to legalise access; to say one 
way or the other, they must be examined on their individual merits. 
However, to examine each of these 29 bills section-by-section, line-by-line would be too 
onerous a task (both for the reader and the author), and would risk obscuring the aim of this project 
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in too many technical and less important details. Instead, I will identify and discuss major similarities 
among the bills and select two major issues to discuss at greater length. This approach has the 
advantage of allowing enough space to be philosophically interesting while remaining empirically 
relevant. 
Laying the foundation 
Before delving into this greater task, it is necessary to lay the basic foundation on which all of 
these proposals lie upon. Two principles the bills all implicitly accept are that certain cases of 
euthanasia can be ethically justifiable, and that the state should concern itself with medical practice, 
including the practice of euthanasia. These fundamental bases for euthanasia legislation seem to be 
well-supported by the majority of the Australian public3, however in the interest of completeness, I 
will briefly defend these two principles here. 
First, that certain cases of euthanasia can be ethical: It needn't matter whether the exemplar 
is theoretical or actual, however if a given case can be said to have been ethical, then we can say 
that future cases of a similar nature would also be ethical. For the sake of relevance I will present the 
actual Australian case of Bob Dent, the first person to make use of the Territory's Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act 1995. If we stick by our initial values of wishing to avoid unnecessary death and 
suffering, for Mr Dent's decision to be ethical, I will now demonstrate that we must (at least) be 
convinced that his decision avoided unnecessary suffering and that death was necessary to alleviate 
this suffering. Anything less would be in violation of our initial values. 
Mr Dent's decision to request euthanasia was after a five year battle with prostate cancer, 
which, in his final months, he described as "a roller-coaster of pain made worse by the unwanted 
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side effects of the [palliative] drugs."4 He had endured countless surgeries and attempts to rid his 
body of the cancer, but his condition had become terminal5 - further treatment would be futile, 
experimental, and/or could easily result in more or worse suffering without any benefit. His 
debilitating illness and constellation of symptoms lead him to make the conscious choice to relieve 
his suffering by the ultimate means, but by the only means left that could - in his view - fully alleviate 
(and be guaranteed to alleviate) his suffering, which it did on 22 September 19966. A combination of 
barbiturates and a muscle relaxant administered by a computerised syringe under the control of Mr 
Dent7 affected his peaceful death within minutes of him confirming his wishes. Before this, a long 
process of confirming his condition, mental state, and personal decision was conducted. A physician 
specialising in Mr Dent's condition confirmed his diagnosis and prognosis, a leading psychiatrist from 
Sydney confirmed he was not suffering from treatable mental illness, and Mr Dent had had time to 
carefully think about his decision during a cooling off period of nine days8. Throughout this entire 
process, his general practitioner, Philip Nitschke, made himself available to Mr Dent to guide him 
through the process and counsel him on his medical options. Dr Nitschke also supervised Mr Dent's 
death and set-up the computerised syringe9. It cannot be said, then, that Mr Dent lacked medical 
information, mental competence, psychological counselling, alternative medical options, or 
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opportunity (at any time) for reconsideration. He made an autonomous choice. Further, the 
alternative medical options available to him would not have alleviated his suffering to an extent that 
was satisfactory to him. 
It is important at this point to distinguish suffering from physical pain - the two are not 
equivalent. Some people can enjoy pain. Muscle soreness after exercise might be physically painful 
but the person experiencing that pain might not be suffering per se because it was self-inflicted for 
the greater purpose and pleasure of exercise and health. Thus, even if Mr Dent's physical pain could 
have been stably, pharmacologically alleviated (which, as it happened, was not possible), he might 
still have suffered, perhaps in a psychological or existential sense which was untreatable except for 
by death. By psychological and existential suffering, we mean suffering that falls outside of the 
general or normal realm of clinical medicine in source, but not necessarily suffering that can't be 
alleviated by clinical medicine in method. For example, Mr Dent might have suffered from a rational 
fear of his future wellbeing or from a loss of autonomy and sense of dignity or meaning in his life. 
Such suffering might not show up in a blood test or be diagnosable via a x-ray, but such suffering 
does exist, and affects people greatly10, especially when they are nearing the end of their natural life. 
While these types of suffering, unrelated to physical pain, might be more difficult for a medical 
doctor to diagnose or make treatment decisions upon, we shouldn't ignore their existence or our 
ability to heal such suffering using medical means. In this case, Mr Dent's suffering - from both 
physical pain and non-physical-pain sources - would have been experienced unnecessarily or 
needlessly (according to Mr Dent's determination of what he found tolerable and necessary for him 
to enjoy his life or to 'live') and so he found that death, in his case, was necessary to avoid this 
suffering. That is not to say that all who found themselves in a position similar to Mr Dent's are 
obligated to make a similar determination, only that if they find their suffering to be intolerable to 
the extent that it is unnecessary for them to suffer it (as determined by them), then their choice to 
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die (to mitigate this suffering) adheres to our initial principles of wishing to avoid unnecessary death 
and suffering. However, these principles need not prevent individuals from continuing to live with 
extreme, or what others consider unbearable or unnecessary, suffering, as individuals might find 
that any amount of suffering is tolerable (or not unnecessary) in order to continuing living in 
whatever capacity they are able to. Additionally, these are not the only relevant principles we ought 
to observe for all cases; we can imagine other relevant principles in theoretical iterations of Mr 
Dent's case. For example, if he had promised his family to stay with them until an important 
personal or cultural event had been celebrated (perhaps Christmas or a birthday), we might say that 
Mr Dent's decision to die before then wasn't as good as if he had honoured his promise (assuming 
there  wasn't another competing factor to warrant otherwise, such as a serious and sudden 
worsening of his symptoms). 
The only sizeable, remaining ethical problem we might have with Mr Dent's decision is the 
suggestion that he devalued his own life - or an objection stemming from the 'sanctity of life' 
argument. A version of this argument could hold that "every person has inherent dignity that should 
be recognised and respected in any condition of health, infirmity or disability"11, and that by being 
euthanised, Mr Dent failed to recognise his life's inherent dignity. Such an argument fails, however, 
when faced by two simple counter-objections: (1) that the dignity, value, or sanctity of Mr Dent's life 
had already been taken by his illness, and (2) that ultimately, since only Mr Dent could genuinely 
evaluate what dignity, value, or sanctity his life had, Mr Dent's autonomous decision ought to be 
respected as being true in the sense of it having the dignity, value, or sanctity he determined it to 
have. If his decision was not autonomous (if he was not mentally competent, for instance), then we - 
as outsiders - could attempt to make such a determination on his behalf. In any other circumstance, 
if a person is mentally competent and can otherwise make an autonomous determination and 
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decision, this must supersede an outsider's belief about that person's life's dignity, value, or sanctity, 
since an outsider cannot have more information about the person than the person themselves. 
That said, we cannot rule out such a decision, even one autonomously made, as being 
misaligned with a patient's best interests. To insist otherwise would be to say that no autonomous 
decision can ever be mistaken in the sense that its results were not in the best interests of the 
person who made the decision. Although we could seek to broaden our definition of autonomy to 
include only what results in our best interests, this would effectively be creating such a high 
standard of 'true autonomy' as to remain almost completely impracticable. For, to know what is in 
our best interests, we might have know not only everything that is possible to know about a 
decision's context or its future ramifications, but also how our decision will affect our interests. We 
must additionally know what our interests definitely are and what they will be in the future. I might 
autonomously choose to watch a particularly horrific film, but this experience may not be in my best 
interests if I then had difficulty sleeping peacefully or became irrationally scared of scenarios which I 
needed to navigate in my everyday life. In the case of someone wishing to be euthanised, it might 
not then have been in that person's interests to meet their grandchildren because their 
grandchildren did not then exist or there was no reason at that time to think they would exist. 
Similarly, perhaps someone could make an autonomous decision to be euthanised but not then 
realise how much a current relationship or feature of their life means to them. So, since perfect 
knowledge of the future and of our own best interests is not always possible, we must admit that 
not all autonomous decisions may be in our best interests. Nevertheless, could you or I reliably stop 
or somehow intervene in such situations to an extent that we are able to save a person from making 
an autonomous decision (to access or not access, say, euthanasia) that happened to not be in their 
best interests? While it might be possible - in principle - to identify a few of these cases, and to even 
successfully intervene in them, to do so reliably would be just as impossible as it would be for the 
persons making such incorrect decisions to reliably realise their mistakes with regards to their 
determination of their own values, their prediction of the future, or in whatever other way they 
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have unfortunately failed to make a decision that would have otherwise been in their best interests. 
Therefore, that we, as autonomous agents, can be victims to our own autonomous decisions due to 
the inherent imperfections of our human capacity to imagine the future, perfectly know our interest, 
etc., is not reason enough to lean  towards any one choice over another by default in any decision - 
important ones especially. Since all choices will have this risk (with respect to being prone to not 
being in our best interests), and possibly all to the same level, it might be just as possible for an 
autonomous agent to be mistaken about their decision to live as it is for another's decision to die. 
Both mistakes would lead to either unnecessary suffering or unnecessary death, but as these 
mistakes cannot be reliably avoided, making either choice the default or only option is arbitrary. 
However, since we would ideally prefer for these mistakes not to be made at all, we can still seek to 
ensure that in as many cases as possible the patient has as the time and information, that is 
reasonable and available to them, to help confirm that such mistakes aren't made. We can also 
attempt to have others confirm the patient's best interests and counsel the patient in their decision-
making process12.  
Mr Dent's determination of his best interests and his decision to die based upon this 
determination was therefore not necessarily any more right or wrong than any others' 
determinations to use (die) or not utilise the Act. This is despite all of these people being fully 
autonomous. However, we can attempt to look at other hypothetical reasons for us to question the 
morality of Mr Dent's decision, which we can only do after knowing more about his specific case - for 
instance, if we knew that he had made a promise to his family to stay with them until a certain time. 
Having this level of knowledge for all potential euthanasia cases, however, is legislatively and 
juridically impracticable. After all, could we say that all cases which met the criteria for the 
Territory's legislation would have been ethical without first examining them in detail? No, this would 
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be naïve; some may have unjustly broken a promise to their family to stay with them until Christmas, 
or in some other way acted immorally. But just as someone's decision to divorce another might be 
out of spite or greed or some other immoral motive, we cannot feasibly wish to prevent all such 
cases. In fact, nor may we generally wish to attempt to prevent such cases, given how we may, in the 
process of our attempts, negatively affect genuine cases based on purer motives. As such, we cannot 
rule out the abuse of even the very best legislation that would legalise euthanasia13. However, just 
as this fact does not stop us from legalising the practice of divorce, it cannot stop us from justifying 
the practice of euthanasia if we determine that in the vast majority of cases the given legislation 
would apply to would be ethical. We must therefore be careful to define under what general 
conditions a person can access euthanasia in order to ensure that, generally, in those conditions, 
euthanasia would be an ethical option. This then leads us to the question of what ethically important 
details we could hope to know about the majority of cases, which we will addressed later. 
The first foundational assumption of these bills, that some cases of euthanasia can be ethical, 
is therefore justified. The second is that the state ought to concern itself with medical practice, 
including the practice of euthanasia. Per our initial principles, we can quickly spot how this is also 
justified. Without medical practice, unnecessary suffering and death would take place. Due to the 
capacities of medical practice to permanently and seriously affect a person's wellbeing and to 
infringe upon or respect their legal rights (like the right not be unduly harmed), if the state wishes to 
ensure their citizens' rights and wellbeing, then the state must seek to regulate medical practice. The 
regulation of palliative care, including various end-of-life options like euthanasia, is therefore fully 
within the realm of the state's obligations to its citizens. Therefore, the state not only has the right 
but also the obligation to concern itself with the ethical practice of euthanasia. Now we may turn to 
more substantive tasks of identifying ethical issues of interest or particular note within proposed 
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euthanasia laws in Australia or their associated debate. Such issues, as we will find, also appear in 
other forums of debate on the ethics of euthanasia legalisation around the world. 
Features and trends of Australian proposals 
Mr Dent's case has already alerted us to issues of effectiveness of the legislation his case (and 
others) was legally subject to, and such effectiveness issues have frequently been the focal point of 
debate in Australian parliaments. Ultimately, the question is whether the state can create effective 
laws applicable to the majority of euthanasia cases for which it intends to legislate on. Another 
frequent area of concern is whether eligibility requirements are reasonable or if they are too open 
or restrictive. A different concern is whether safeguards are comprehensive enough to avoid general 
or widespread abuses14 while simultaneously not overburdening genuine cases with too many hoops 
to jump through. A final area of concern, and one which was not addressed by initial proposals in 
Australia, is over appropriate, ongoing oversight and how or if the state ought to respond to 
controversial cases. Over the past twenty years, Australian parliaments have attempted to address 
these concerns, and in doing so have revealed some common areas of contention, advances in 
ethical thinking, and potential ethical problem areas. I will now highlight some ethically salient 
features of this history, bearing mind that our final aim is to determine which (if any) euthanasia 
proposals presented to Australian parliaments should have become, or remained, law. 
When the Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 1995 was presented in the Legislative Assembly of 
the Northern Territory by Country Liberal Party member and Chief Minister Marshall Perron and was 
passed, the main focus of its debate centred around eligibility requirements and safeguards. Patients 
needed to be an adult, competent at the time their wishes were expressed and carried out, 
diagnosed with a terminal illness, and suffering as a result of that illness. At least two doctors must 
have reviewed the patient's case and supported the request for euthanasia, and a psychiatrist must 
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have assessed the patient and found them to not be suffering from treatable mental illness. The 
patient needed to be fully informed throughout the entire process and a cooling-off period was 
mandated. These basic conditions were mostly adopted in subsequent proposals with two 
exceptions and two additions. 
The first exception, and which became present in the large majority of proposals thereafter, 
was that patients would not be required to be competent at the time their wishes were carried out 
providing that they were competent while the safeguards and cooling-off period were satisfied. This 
was a notable feature of the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1997 presented in the Legislative Council of 
Western Australia by Democrats member Norm Kelly. Section 10 read as follows: "Where [a patient] 
becomes mentally incompetent, whether permanently or episodically, after making a request - (a) 
but before [safeguards, including the mandated cooling-off period,] have been completed, the 
request lapses; (b) and the [safeguards, including the mandated cooling-off period,] have been 
completed, the request has effect." 
The second exception and first addition was presented in a single bill, the Dignity in Dying Bill 
2002, presented in the Legislative Council of South Australia by Democrats member Sandra Kanck 
(and substantially contributed to by independent member Bob Such from the House of Assembly). 
The exception was that the patient need not be terminally ill, only "hopelessly ill", defined as such: 
"a person is hopelessly ill if the person has an injury or illness - (a) that will result, or has resulted, in 
serious mental impairment or permanent deprivation of consciousness; or (b) that seriously and 
irreversibly impairs the person's quality of life so that life has become intolerable to that person and 
there is no realistic chance of clinical improvement". The addition was in the form of oversight, and 
was substantial. The bill established the role of a registrar, who would maintain a register of all 
voluntary euthanasia requests and their status (active or revoked), and who could also conduct 
inquiries to determine the veracity of information recorded or to be recorded in the register. A 
monitoring committee comprised of medical and legal professionals, lay people, and a minister of 
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religion, was required to monitor and review the operation and administration of the proposed Act, 
and report to the responsible government minister. This minister was also required to make an 
annual report to Parliament on the operation and administration of the proposed Act. 
The second major addition was that of requiring the patient be a resident of the jurisdiction 
the bill was passed in. The first (and so far only) proposal made in the Victorian Parliament was also 
the first in Australia to include this eligibility requirement in the Medical Treatment (Physician 
Assisted Dying) Bill 2008, presented by Greens member Colleen Hartland in the Legislative Council. 
The motivation behind this addition was to avoid 'suicide tourism', like practices in parts of 
Switzerland have been branded15. The Territory's lawmakers also considered including such a 
requirement in 1995, however ultimately decided not to pursue this requirement. Then Health 
Services Minister Fred Finch stated during parliamentary debate that "legal advice has been received 
from the Solicitor for the Northern Territory that it may be unconstitutional to deny residents from 
other states access to the legislation"1617. 
Together, these exceptions and additions to the initial requirements set out in the 1995 Act 
passed in the Northern Territory have highlighted one general and two specific developments in 
ethical thinking by lawmakers. The general, overarching trend towards greater complexity and 
length of the bills is evident by word and section count alone - the bill passed in 1995 had less than 
4,000 words across 20 sections, whereas the most recent proposal made in Tasmania, the Voluntary 
Assisted Dying Bill 2013, had over 8,000 words across 37 sections. This increasing complexity 
demonstrates that, as the national discourse has progressed, political proponents have become 
more sophisticated in their ethical thinking, likely in part as a response to objections raised by 
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political opponents. That this has brought about the development of oversight measures and a rich 
debate on eligibility requirements is credit to the democratic process (even if the majority of 
politicians have historically ignored the overwhelming public support - eighty-five per cent18 - that 
the Australian public have for legalising voluntary euthanasia for the terminally ill). This is also a 
reflection of the two specific developments in ethical thinking, namely the consideration of 
appropriate oversight measures (which were not present in bills until the early 2000s) and the 
increasing diversity of opinion on eligibility requirements, including if patients need to be residents 
of a particular jurisdiction or if they must have a terminal illness. 
These specific developments in ethical thinking could be the sole subjects of essays in their 
own rights, and have been sufficiently interesting and complex to engage social and political 
commentators in years past, as well as many moral philosophers. However in the interests of space 
and remaining philosophically interesting, and as mentioned at the outset, this essay will focus on 
only two issues collectively raised by Australian proposals for euthanasia legalisation. Since oversight 
measures have been historically less controversial than eligibility requirements, the two selected 
issues relate solely to eligibility requirements. The first issue, whether patients need be terminally ill, 
has been presented in a number of proposals, however the second, whether patients need be an 
adult, has thus far been neglected by Australian parliaments (all proposals to date have required 
patients to be adults, and occasionally aged over 21 years). 
Terminal illness requirements 
Was Mr Dent terminally ill? It depends on how we wish to define the term. Legally, to access 
euthanasia in the way he did, he needed to be terminally ill as defined by the Territory's 1995 Act: he 
needed to have "an illness which, in reasonable medical judgment will, in the normal course, without 
the application of extraordinary measures or of treatment unacceptable to the patient, result in the 
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death of the patient." On a literal reading, this could be interpreted to include someone who would 
die as a result of refusing treatment on the grounds that it was unacceptable to them, even if their 
illness was a simple infection and the treatment was an antibiotic. The difficulty would be for such a 
patient to convince their medical doctors (especially a psychiatrist) that the treatment was so 
unacceptable to them that they would rather die, and that this was not an elaborate means of 
suicide motivated by mental illness. Although it is difficult to imagine such a scenario, it is within the 
realm of possibility; some patients refuse blood transfusions on the basis of their religious beliefs, 
and can also subsequently die. However, are these patients acting on rational beliefs? No, and "[w]e 
do not respect autonomy when we encourage people to act on irrational beliefs. Rather, such beliefs 
limit a person's autonomy."19 We needn't go so far as enforcing what we perceive to be the rational 
decision20, since this can be more open to question, but we should insist on rational beliefs being 
used as the basis for decision-making as this is less open to question. Whether it is rational to believe 
that the food you have been served at a restaurant has been poisoned or not is far easier to resolve 
than the question of whether it is reasonable to then eat the food. The former question hinges more 
or less on demonstrable particulars about the world we live in and how likely these are to be true, 
whereas the second question relies much more heavily on our personal values. If we wished to die, 
for instance, it would be entirely rational to eat the poisoned food, but if we believed the food was 
poisoned without good reason for thinking so, it is much harder to say we are being rational. 
Similarly, if someone would rather die than be treated with a life-saving blood transfusion or an 
antibiotic, it is difficult to say they are acting rationally without further explanation. Therefore, to 
avoid such irrationally-based decisions to be euthanised, if we wish to restrict euthanasia only to 
those who are terminally ill (as conceived in the common parlance), then we should redefine 
terminal illness to something like: "an illness which, in reasonable medical judgment will, in the 
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normal course, without the application of extraordinary measures or of treatment unacceptable to a 
reasonable patient, result in the death of the patient." This is closer to how we commonly conceive 
of terminal illness, since it would avoid cases where an irrational, unreasonable patient who, 
because of "ignorance, not caring enough about rational deliberation, [or] making mistakes in 
deliberation"21, is unable to make a fully autonomous choice, leading to their inappropriate legal 
status as 'terminally ill'. 
If this definition was adopted, a further question arises: how far should a patient progress in 
their treatment before it is reasonable for them to stop? Reasonable people will surely disagree on 
this point, depending on their set of circumstances, tolerance for pain, personal values, and a 
multitude of other factors (some may even say that others' factors are non-factors and vice-versa). A 
reasonable person standard is not as difficult to maintain in the context of informed consent, as this 
standard may be tested in the courts on a case-by-case basis when the need arises22. However, 
unless we wish to legislate individual, case-by-case review of all requests for euthanasia to 
determine (for each one) whether they are 'reasonable', we could easily cause unnecessary delay 
and suffering for many patients. Further, it would be asking that patients first demonstrate their 
reasonableness before they can be granted access to their requested treatment, a requirement we 
do not require for the opposite treatment (receiving palliative care) or generally for treatments 
which have a high chance of mortality or morbidity or suffering. It also assumes that the medical 
staff involved can make no accurate determination about the reasonableness of the patient's 
decision or of their own reasonableness in supporting the patient's request.  
 To avoid such a cumbersome mechanism for defining terminal illness, we could seek to very 
clearly but arbitrarily define terminal illness, for example by restricting access to patients whose 
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prognosis, according to their medical doctors, is less than 12 months. But again we run into 
problems. What if, by nature of their illness, a patient will not be capable of consenting during their 
final 12 months due to the nature of the illness' progression? Wouldn't we be tacitly accepting an 
unjust system due to the inevitable variance of professional medical opinion with respect to a 
patient's prognosis - couldn't identical patients with different medical teams be offered access to 
euthanasia at different times due to these professional differences of opinion? And what makes 12 
months the right amount of time? Why not six or three or 36? In total, the answers to these 
questions cannot be satisfactorily provided without recognition of the underlying unfairness 
inherent in an arbitrary medical definition. (Such a problem reoccurs in the exclusion of children 
from euthanasia access, as I will discuss later.) The pragmatic advantage of such a definition, 
however, is that cases can be readily measured against it. Should this advantage of the definition 
prove to outweigh its potential arbitrary unfairness, then we could seek to adopt it in legislation. 
However, if this advantage does not seem to outweigh the potential for arbitrary unfairness (as I 
think it does not), and we still wish to restrict euthanasia access to those commonly conceived as 
being terminally ill, then we are left with two options: we may return to the standard of what a 
reasonable patient would consider unacceptable treatment while accepting that there can be no 
perfectly consistent judgement of what is reasonable - perhaps so much so that differences in 
professional legal opinion would result in the same injustices as would occur in the arbitrary medical 
definition; or, we could leave this determination predominantly up to the patients and doctors 
involved in each case (as the Territory's Act seemed to do). 
Alternatively still, we could altogether abandon the requirement of the patient's illness being 
terminal. After all, couldn't a patient who is not terminally ill conceivably be suffering just as much as 
someone who is? In a physical or emotional sense, this is easily imagined. However, the sense that 
might intuitively be thought of as different is the existential one. Surely one could not suffer 
existentially without one's existence being physically threatened. But what about non-physically 
threatened? Although we could draw this up to another definitional issue, we cannot ignore there 
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being some common themes when people come to defining existential suffering23. The definitions 
given by chaplains, palliative physicians, and algologists (physicians specialising in the treatment of 
pain) typically emphasise different words and concepts. Yet, among these differences24, there 
remain common themes, like anxiety of the future, the meaning of one's life, and personal 
relationships. Such themes can and have reoccurred in the thoughts of relatively physically and 
emotionally healthy people (or, at least, not people without terminal illness), like in the Dutch case 
of Edward Brongersma25. The former Dutch senator was euthanised by his general practitioner in 
1998 after repeated requests and claiming he was 'weary of life'. His doctor testified that 
Brongersma felt personally important parts of his life's work (and, therefore, his life's meaning) as a 
political activist had not succeeded in the way he had hoped, and that, combined with the deaths of 
his close friends and his own declining health, he had become weary of life. The GP made no 
intimation that Brongersma felt he had become weary of being a burden on society due to his age, 
as is sometimes26 argued as being a prominent concern due to the commonly negative view society 
has of the aged generally27. Such a case should therefore be defined in terms of  existential suffering. 
Brongersma's meaning in life and personal relationships were being taken away from him, and he 
was likely under no disillusionment that he, like his remaining friends, would die soon, too (he had 
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potential to be anxious about his future). Could he have found meaning for his life in something new? 
Could he have overcome his anxiousness about the future, and created new interpersonal 
relationships? Perhaps. However it is a big ask of someone to effectively recreate the most 
meaningful and intimate parts of their life. Some might not even feel their 'new' life was their own - 
that their real life was their old one, the one they lost, and phoney replacement wouldn't make 
'them' whole. Said differently, once they lost their original meaning, in a sense they were already 
dead. It's no wonder that, after facing tragic personal loss like the death or deaths of loved ones, 
people often describe themselves as feeling 'lost' or 'like a ghost'. In these cases, their identities had 
been invested in these relationships or what or who they lost. And with the loss of these people or 
things, their identity is lost, and so it is quite literally true that they themselves are lost, in that 
moment - they, the person (as they were), no longer exist28. As anthropologist Margaret Lock 
describes of how individuals are conceived in traditional Japanese culture, "individuals ... are 
conceptualized as residing at the center of a network of obligations, so that personhood is 
constructed out-of-mind, beyond body, in the space of ongoing human relationships."29 When we 
lose our relationships or obligations we have to ourselves or others that instil us with meaning, our 
personhood diminishes. It is at these often dire moments that we are left with a choice: will we 
resurrect our persons anew, will we choose to live with this sub-personhood, or will we choose to let 
get of our personhood altogether? Clearly it is not rational nor preferable for us to make a decision 
of life or death in what can be only be an emotionally-orientated state of mind, given the 
circumstances and our human nature. However, if, after pushing through this initial emotional stage, 
we come to a rational decision about how we would prefer our life to proceed, there seems to be no 
obvious justification for society to impose the opposite of whatever we prefer. That is, barring 
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exceptional cases where you had a serious obligation to society or part thereof - even if it were only 
to a single individual. For example, we might say that non-life sentenced prisoners or life-sentenced 
prisoners with the possibility of parole have an obligation to society to attempt rehabilitation. A life-
sentenced prisoner without the possibility of parole does not have this obligation due to the purpose 
of their imprisonment being to effect their permanent removal from general society for theirs and 
society's own good; their only remaining obligations are to themselves and possibly to their victims 
or some higher institution of justice (perhaps, too, to their friends or family, but we should not 
attempt to legislate interpersonal ethics to this degree). 
Walt Kowalski, the protagonist of the film Gran Torino (2008), is a classic redemption or 
'personal resurrection' story. He valued his family, especially his wife, but when she died and Walt 
couldn't connect with his children, horrors he had witnessed in the Korean War plagued his thoughts 
and he felt his life lacked any positive meaning. In a very literal sense, his life (as he had once known 
it) was over, and all that remained was negative emotions and memories. In a scene where Walt's 
priest challenges him to explain what he knows about life and death, Walt readily recounts his 
nightmares from Korea, but when asked "What about life?", he can merely offer elementary 
autobiographical, not vivid nor emotive, details. At this point, Walt had a choice: he could seek to 
physically die, he could physically live but remain existentially dead, or he could attempt to work a 
'miracle' by resurrecting the existential (or whole) part of his person (that is, discovering or creating 
new meaning for his life). In the film, circumstances would oblige him to create new meaning in the 
form of protecting and informally adopting his neighbours' children, who were being targeted by a 
local gang. In this way, he becomes like the prisoner who has an obligation to society, only this 
obligation wasn't entirely self-imposed, but rather more due to happenstance. He accepts this 
obligation begrudgingly, at first, perhaps because he feels that by replacing the old meaning of his 
family with a new meaning would be to totally let go of the old one, however painful and bereft it 
remains. Such evolution of life's meaning might not be possible or preferable for all. Had it not been 
for exceptional circumstances, Walt may never have made such a transition. If he had not been 
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obliged (or forced by circumstance) and had instead been posed with the free choice of whether to 
recreate the existential part of his person, whatever conscious choice he made (due to whatever 
reasons he chose, so long as they had been rationally-based) should have been respected. 
Had he decided against transformation, as Brongersma did, we could not fault him (again, so 
long as he made this choice rationally and did not rely purely on his emotions). He - like Brongersma 
- faced a reduced level of personhood via existential death brought about by extreme and prolonged 
existential suffering. He would have merely been aligning his physical and emotional self with his 
existential self. In Brongersma's case, this was not seen as valid cause for medical assistance in dying. 
'Unbearable suffering', as is required in the Netherlands to be eligible for euthanasia, was decided by 
the Supreme Court via this case as having a limited meaning: the suffering could only be that which 
was explained by disease, and excludes 'non-medical' (existential) suffering. This, however, over- 
medicalises and -technifies the role of the medical profession, which is primarily to heal. To 
discriminate between types of suffering based on their source or form (rather than, say, their 
severity), is fundamentally inconsistent with the medical profession's primary role of healing. Yes, 
the medical profession may be ill-equipped and even claim to have "no expertise to judge such 
suffering"30, but this does not mean they do not have a role in treating such suffering if it can be 
independently judged by the person or by other professions who do have the expertise to judge 
such suffering. Further, it should be the obligation of the medical profession to seek expertise in the 
judgement of such suffering so that they may fulfil their role as healers. Failing to do so is to unfairly 
discriminate against those who just so happen to suffer from the 'wrong' source. Historically, this 
happened a large scale once before; for a time, some in the medical profession did not recognise 
(and some still do not fully recognise) the types of psychological suffering experienced by those with 
mental disorders. They might say something like, "Because I can't see this in a blood test or an x-ray, 
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it doesn't exist or it can't be treated via medical means." Although we now know that many mental 
disorders have biological bases, we also recognise that such disorders can be generated in part or 
whole by a person's experience - post-traumatic stress disorder, for example. Yet, despite such 
conditions being induced psychosocially (or not having a strictly biological aetiology in the first 
instance), we still endeavour to treat the resultant suffering medically because we recognise that 
such suffering both exists, and can be alleviated via medical means. The same is also true for 
existential suffering. 
Ideally, if someone is competent and rational, we ought to allow that person to determine 
what their own level and severity of suffering is as a direct result of their experiencing it (incidentally, 
we routinely employ such a system in triage situations for grading physical suffering by asking, "On a 
scale of one to ten, with ten being the worst pain possible [or, sometimes, 'ever experienced'] and 
one being no pain, how much pain are you in?"). Attempts to ignore 'non-medical' suffering by 
evoking a suffering value system where source is what matters is fundamentally misaligned with 
medicine's role to heal and goes against medical practice's otherwise near-total respect for 
autonomy (in this case, the autonomy to choose our own value system for whether the source of 
suffering matters). Even if some medical doctors cannot, at this moment, fathom that existential 
suffering exists or should be treated medically, it does not justify their enforcement of their own 
values upon patients. As Kymlicka wrote31: "While we may be mistaken in our beliefs about value, it 
doesn't follow that someone else, who has reason to believe that a mistake has been made, can 
come along and improve my life by leading it for me, in accordance with the correct account of value. 
On the contrary, no life goes better by being led from the outside according to values the person 
doesn't endorse. My life only goes better if I'm leading it from inside, according to my beliefs about 
value." 
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The only bastion of refuge might be that, if someone is onl experiencing existential suffering 
and not physical or emotional suffering, and otherwise has the autonomy and ability to commit 
unassisted suicide, then perhaps medical doctors should focus their efforts on helping those who 
could otherwise not physically or emotionally commit unassisted suicide. However, such a 
justification could only be invoked in situations where the number of patients who were requesting 
euthanasia far outnumbered the means of carrying out their euthanasia. This is similar to how we 
might justify making a patient change their own bandage if they were physically able to in an 
overcrowded hospital which had limited medical staff. Were the hospital not overcrowded and 
understaffed, then such a justification would not be possible. 
Age requirements 
A slightly different form of unjust discrimination in Australian proposals to legalise euthanasia 
has been age restrictions, except that it involves one added complication: informed consent. 
Although no provisions for children to access euthanasia have made their way into any proposed 
legislation in Australia, this deficiency has been raised during parliamentary debate and was even 
raised during the very first debate, in 1995: "This proposed legislation provides that something can 
be done provided the person is over 18 [years of age]. However, if it were my 9-year-old 
stepdaughter who happened to be in that circumstance, it would be okay for me to watch her 
continue to suffer. The legislation has no provision for children. Is it easier to watch a child dying in 
agony than an adult? ... Will we deal with children? What happens when a [child with Down's 
syndrome] is dying in agony. Do we ignore them too? Why is it right for a mentally-competent adult, 
but not right for anybody else? ... Interestingly, a 17-year-old cannot make a choice [to be 
euthanised], but an 18-year-old can."32 
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In 2012, there were 147,098 deaths in Australia. Of those, 2,003, or 1.36 per cent, were of 
people aged 19 years or younger33. Since not all of these deaths would have been slow or involved 
unbearable suffering, it is fair to say there would be very few cases where euthanasia for children 
could be a conceivable option in comparison to adult cases (whatever the exact numbers). That does 
make this a minor issue, however - the unnecessary suffering of children should still be avoided if 
possible and if those children wish to avoid it. We might even have more reason to avoid such 
suffering than we do in the case of adult suffering, since we typically view such early deaths and 
suffering as particularly unfair and heartbreaking34; "They weren't given the opportunity live a full, or 
even close to full, life," or "Their overriding experience of life has been suffering and illness." 
As implied during parliamentary debate, restricting access to euthanasia to those aged 18 
years and over relies on an arbitrary judgement of what constitutes an individual who has the 
capacity to consent to something. While such arbitrary judgements might make the application of 
laws more straightforward (like they do when using a medically arbitrary definition of terminal 
illness), unjust consequences inherently follow. A 17-year-and-364-day-old child does not become, 
overnight, a fully-competent adult, capable of consenting to euthanasia; autonomy and the 
competency to make one's own decisions is a gradual process, and we should recognise it as such. 
This is also part of accepted parenting practices. We probably would not think it was appropriate for 
a parent to let their 4-year-old child travel independently to school, whereas when the same child is 
14-years-old we wouldn't have the same concerns. Likewise, if a child does not understand the 
concepts of life and death, we could not find it appropriate for that child to be given the choice to be 
euthanised, however if they did, and could demonstrate this understanding to us, how could we still 
find their being given this choice inappropriate? 
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It could be that we would still have intuitive biases and doubts about whether a child can or 
really does understand the ramifications of their decision, and this could be clouding our rational 
judgement of their capacities and maturity. We also tend to look upon children as uniformly 
innocent, naïve, and therefore in need of our protection. Empirically, however, not all may need as 
much protection as we might think; by the age of seven most children have a good understanding of 
what death is35. This involves understanding a number of features of death36, namely universality 
(that we all die), irreversibility (that once we are dead we cannot become alive again), 
nonfunctionality (that we cease to function as humans upon death), and causality (that disease, 
accident, or other internal and external events can lead to death). However, advanced 
understanding of death is unlikely to come all at once, and probably involves a gradual development 
of understanding, starting at the level of individual features. For example, a child might be aware of 
the universality of death but simultaneously have unrealistic beliefs about causality37.  Although 
more empirical research needs to be conducted on this topic, there have been some reports of 
terminal illness and the experience of the death of a loved one impacting positively on children's 
conceptions of death38 - that is, their conception became more realistic or they understood certain 
features of death better than children without these experiences. This is understandable given that 
in a hospital context (as terminally ill children or children who have experienced the loss of a loved 
one will be familiar with), they are exposed to a fundamentally different environment to that which 
they have otherwise experienced or that a normal child would experience. In a hospital setting, you 
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are surrounded by the realities of death, and may even become aware of age peers who are dying, 
suffering, or have died. 
Still, we might have reason to suspect that a child who does not yet understand death but 
could - if they did understand it - benefit from being given the option to be euthanised. In this case, 
we should not present the option to the child until we first can help them to come to an 
understanding about their current situation and can also form a realistic conception of death. 
Parents and carers inform children of the child's medical condition and treatment options, helping 
them to form accurate conceptions of what life would be like, for example, after undergoing a 
particular surgery. In the same way, parents and carers could help children form accurate 
conceptions of what it would be like if the child died (where that is likely, such as due to the natural 
progress of a terminal illness, or where that might be preferable to the child if they are experiencing 
severe suffering). That they merely do not yet understand it due to their passively gained knowledge 
of death via their experience of the world does not necessarily mean they are incapable of 
understanding death if it was actively explained to them. And, in some cases, such active explanation 
may be as warranted as other types of explanation about the likely progression of a disease or the 
amount of suffering the child is likely to experience in the future due to that disease. 
Conclusions 
Ultimately, someone's age or the source of their suffering should not be barriers to euthanasia 
access. Having an accurate conception of death and basing one's decision on rational beliefs, 
however, are justifiable barriers to euthanasia access. Restricting access to terminally ill adults 
arbitrarily deprives non-terminally-ill and/or non-adults from salving their unnecessary suffering. An 
objection to this might be that such arbitrariness is juridically required if any laws to legalise 
euthanasia are to be practicable. While in other contexts we might be able to acknowledge that 
some children would be capable (being adequately mature and responsible) of driving a car or being 
able to independently sign a contract, having an arbitrary line in the sand is merely an inconvenience 
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and not a matter of life, death, or unbearable suffering. The level of injustice we accept in 
disallowing mature and responsible children from being able to independently drive a car is not the 
same level of injustice as we would be accepting if we disallowed mature and responsible children 
from accessing euthanasia when they were experiencing unbearable and extreme suffering 
(additionally assuming they had accurate conceptions of death and would base their decision on 
rational beliefs). Given this hugely disparate level of injustice in accepting one case of arbitrariness 
compared to the other, we can say that in different cases we can be better justified in using an 
somewhat arbitrary standard than in others. 
As for the many Australian proposals which attempted to (or successfully) legalise(d) 
euthanasia, none were singularly perfect. None, for example, allowed children to access euthanasia, 
and few sought to allow non-terminally-ill patients access. Proposals which had a breadth of 
oversight and broad eligibility conditions were therefore best, and should have generally been 
passed. One of the best exemplars among the proposals was the Dignity in Dying Bill 2005, 
presented by Bob Such in the South Australian House of Assembly. It did not completely discriminate 
against non-terminally-ill patients, however, the definition used would still not cover existential 
suffering alone due the requirement that the suffering be a result of an "injury or illness"39. As well 
as discriminating against the source of suffering, it (like all other proposals) unfairly discriminated 
against the suffering experienced by children. Nonetheless, like many other proposals, it would have 
been a step in the right direction, and we cannot reasonably expect perfect legislation to pass all at 
the same time or within a single bill - there will likely be a gradual advance in ethical thinking, like we 
have observed over the past 20 years. Ideally, though, Australian - and international - proposals 
ought to incorporate more sophisticated and realistic views of autonomy, capacity for understanding, 
and suffering. We should seek to establish the role of the medical profession as indiscriminate 
healers of human suffering - whatever the source is, and whatever age the person experiencing it is. 
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Appendix I. List of proposed bills to legalise voluntary euthanasia by date first presented to a 
parliament in Australia. 
Year Parliament Presented by Proposed bill title (and number) 
1995 NT MP Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill (Serial 67) 
1995 SA JQ Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 
1995 ACT MM Medical Treatment (Amendment) Bill 
1996 SA AL Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 
1997 WA NK Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (87) 
1997 ACT MM Euthanasia Referendum Bill 
1998 WA NK Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (8) 
2000 SA BS Dignity in Dying Bill 
2000 WA NK Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (121) 
2001 NSW IC Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 
2002 SA BS Dignity in Dying Bill 
2002 WA RC Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (149) 
2002 SA SK Dignity in Dying Bill 
2003 NSW IC Voluntary Euthanasia Trial (Referendum) Bill (?) 
2005 SA BS Dignity in Dying Bill (79) 
2006-8 SA BS Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (2006/102), (2007/14), (2008/20)* 
2008 SA MP Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary 
Euthanasia) Amendment Bill (34) 
2008 VIC CH Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 
2009 TAS NJM Dying with Dignity Bill (37) 
2010 SA BS Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 
2010 SA MP Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care (Voluntary 
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Euthanasia) Amendment Bill 
2010 SA SK Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences-End of Life 
Arrangements) Amendment Bill 
2010 WA RC Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (108) 
2011 SA SK Criminal Law Consolidation (Medical Defences-End of Life 
Arrangements) Amendment Bill (88) 
2012 SA BS Voluntary Euthanasia Bill (11) 
2013  NSW CF Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 
2013 TAS LTG  & NJM Voluntary Assisted Dying Bill (61) 
2013 SA BS Ending Life with Dignity Bill (213) 
2014 Cmth RD Medical Services (Dying with Dignity) Exposure Draft Bill ** 
Five additional bills proposed in the federal senate attempted to repeal the Euthanasia Laws Act 
1997, which was used to overrule the Northern Territory's 1995 decision to enact the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill. The federal bills to undo the overruling were excluded from the above list as they did 
not propose new laws and would otherwise have an identical ethical assessment as the Northern 
Territory's 1995 legalisation bill. For reference, however, these bills were titled: Euthanasia Laws 
(Repeal) Bill 2004; Australian Territories Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill 2007; Rights of the Terminally 
Ill (Euthanasia Laws Repeal) Bill 2008; Restoring Territory Rights (Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation) 
Bill 2008; Restoring Territory Rights (Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation) Bill 2012. 
 
*Due to South Australian parliamentary procedure and the sitting program for the 51st Parliament of 
South Australia, BS was required to re-present his 2006 bill (no. 102) to the second and third 
sessions of parliament in 2007 (no. 14) and 2008 (no. 20), respectively. The bills are identical. 
 
**RD's 2014 bill is not yet a formally presented bill, but is likely to be soon, and thus included in this 
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list for that reason. 
 
Parliament key: 
NT = Northern Territory; WA = Western Australia; VIC = Victoria; TAS = Tasmania; Cmth = 
Commonwealth; NSW = New South Wales 
 
Parliamentarian key: 
MP = Marshall Perron; NK = Hon. Norm Kelly; MM = Michael Moore; RC = Robin Chapple; CH = 
Colleen Hartland; NJM = Nicholas James McKim; JQ = John Quirke; AL = Anne Levy; BS = Bob Such; SK 
= Sandra Kanck; MP = Mark Parnell; SK = Steph Key; LTG = Larissa Tahireh Giddings; IC = Ian Cohen; 
CF = Cate Faehrmann; RD = Richard Di Natale 
 
